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IMPLICATIONS OF PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT MODELS FOR 
INDEPENDENT AUDITS
Chairman of Session, Douglas R. Carmichael
Marty Gruber has prepared an outline on implications of
portfolio management. Marty, do you want to start.
Outline Prepared by Martin Gruber
I. BACKGROUND. There are three theories of general approaches to 
theory which make alternative assumptions about the degree of 
perfection in security markets.
A. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (GAPM). Equilibrium 
exists in the capital markets—deviations from equi­
librium are non-predictable—all investors should hold 
the "market portfolio" at all times.
B. The Single Index Model. Popularly called the Beta model. 
If investors have (or believe they have) some forecasting 
ability, they should (will) hold a portfolio which is 
very widely but less than fully diversified. The risk
in investors’ portfolios that is not market related 
approaches zero and so investors should only be concerned 
with the sensitivity of their portfolios to market 
movements (the Beta coefficient). In this model, the 
user is concerned with forecasting the return from each 
stock and the Beta for each stock.
C. Full Variance-Covariance Models. Holders of small 
portfolios must be concerned with non-market related 
risk as well as market related risk. They must estimate 
expected returns, the uncertainty of returns for each 
stock (variances) and the co-movements between the 
returns on all stocks (correlations).
The CAPM makes horrendous assumptions about investor behavior, 
e.g., homogeneous expectations, the ability of investors to lend 
and borrow unlimited amounts of money at the riskless rate, etc. 
Nevertheless, it seems to provide a good approximations to the 
behavior of security markets. Furthermore, large institutional 
investors are starting to act as if they believed in the CAPM model, 
as evidenced by the establishment of an increasing number of index 
funds .
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The Single Index Model seems appropriate for those investors 
who wish to act on forecasting ability and still take advantage 
of the benefits of portfolio diversification.
Despite the implications of theory, empirical evidence 
indicates that most individual investors still hold portfolios 
consisting of two to three stocks. For these investors, the 
Full Variance-Covariance Model is appropriate.
SOME POINTS FOR DISCUSSION
A. If the CAPM is a good description of reality, then relevant 
information is being supplied to investors, either by the 
accounting profession or by others. Auditing still has a 
role, for the cost of funds to users is a function of 
perceived risk. To the extent that the auditing process 
can lower perceived risk, it can lower the cost of funds.
B. If the CAPM does not hold, then the investor must forecast:
1. The expected level of future returns.
2. Risk—measured either by the relationship between returns 
and the market (Beta), or the variability of returns
and the co-movement between securities.
C. Expected Returns. Evidence shows that 85%-90% of the 
information contained in annual earnings announcements is 
incorporated in stock prices before the announcement is made. 
This implies that information is leaked (signaled) to the 
market earlier than the report. Should the. auditor be 
responsible for the accuracy of this information, or for
at least seeing that it is not leaked to special groups?
Should the auditor be responsible for making sure that 
relevant information that will bear on future returns be 
made available to the public at the time that audited reports 
are made available (or even more frequently)? To what 
extent should non-accounting economic information be reported 
and audited? For example, planned advertising and R & D 
expenditures, contracted changes in wage costs, managers’ 
estimates of future earnings, planned changes In financing 
policy.
Empirical evidence indicates that the market, in setting 
stock prices, can see through alternative accounting methods. 
Nevertheless, the cost of "seeing through" accounting 
changes or alternative accounting methods is not costless. 
Might not costs be reduced (returns increased) if the cost of
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restating financial data is borne once by the accountant, 
rather than individually by each user?
D. Risk. Very little has been done to link accounting data 
to risk. Some work has been done on the prediction of 
Betas from accounting data. While most of the variables 
used as input to the prediction process are already 
reported, two are not:
1. The past level of Beta itself.
2. The insensitivity of the firm's earnings to the average 
level of earnings in the economy (earnings Betas).
Should the auditor see that these measures are included in 
company reports?
To what extent should the auditor help the investor assess 
risk by reporting probabilistic information when data is subject 
to uncertainty?
To what extent should the auditor be responsible for reporting 
major uncertainties in the company's future?
Since the tendency of the returns of a firm to change with 
the returns in other companies is a major input to many portfolio 
models; to what extent should audited statements contain measures 
of the extent to which the returns of a firm vary with its 
industry and other industries or economic sectors?
Discussion Leader, Martin Gruber
I guess I should start with a disclaimer. When Mike first 
asked me to talk about this topic, I found it an interesting one. 
My background is in financial theory rather than in accounting.
In fact, before this morning, I'm not sure I knew what the job 
of the auditor was; perhaps, I still don’t know what the job of
the auditor is.
But I would like to start with a few words about portfolio 
theory in general. I might note that there are three widely 
accepted texts on portfolio theory which have come out in the last
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few years. Not one of those texts mentions accounting data or 
financial data at all.
There are three theories of portfolio management, which make 
different amounts of assumptions about the perfection of 
capital markets. The capital asset pricing model really states 
that equilibrium exists in the capital market at all points in 
time and that all investors should hold the market portfolio of 
stocks, should not trade, should not try to make any judgments 
on information. The single-index model, another model which has 
gained wide acceptance in recent years, is popularly called the 
Beta model. It holds that if investors have, or believe they 
have, some forecasting ability, they will hold a portfolio which 
is widely diversified, but not perfectly diversified. This port­
folio will tend to mirror market movements, and the only risk 
in the portfolio is that concerned with how sensitive are movements 
of stock prices to market movements. We can capture the risk and 
return by looking at the forecasted returns for each stock, plus 
the relationship of each stock to the market. And finally, 
there is something we call the Full Variance/Covariance Model, 
which says that holders of small portolios must be concerned
with non-market related risks as well as market related risk.
They have to look at the uncertainty associated with the return 
on each stock, and the way stocks tend to move together, the 
co-movement between each security.
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The Capital Asset Pricing Model makes a set of very- 
strict assumptions about the way the capital market works. It 
assumes things like homogeneous expectations, and the fact 
that investors can lend and borrow at a riskless rate of 
interest. However, despite these horrendous assumptions, It 
appears to be a very good approximation to the way capital 
markets really behave. Furthermore, in the past few years, 
we have seen institutional investors act to an increasing extent 
as if they believed in this model, the increasing use of index 
funds for example, which are basically funds that are meant to 
replicate the market portfolio, the total group of stocks out 
there. Several pension funds now run index funds and invest part 
of their money in the market portfolio. Private institutions 
are offering index funds to customers.
The other extreme is this model that says you have to 
look at the risk between all securities. Recent empirical 
evidence on investment behavior by individuals has suggested 
that the bulk of individuals that hold stocks hold portfolios 
that consist of two or three stocks, which would suggest, at 
least in terms of behavior, that there is some reason to measure 
the relationship between stock prices.
Even if we believe in the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 
this doesn't say that there is no role for the auditor, because 
the price of funds in this model is a function of perceived risk.
(PAGES 157-165 inadvertently OMITTED  IN TYPING)
- 157 -
-167-
To the extent that auditing lowers the perceived risk in
holding securities,  it lowers the cost of funds to corporations 
and can lead to a better allocation of funds in the economy.
When we talk about any of these models, we have to tie back 
into the efficient market hypothesis.
Let me, more to provoke you than anything else, tell one 
of my favorite efficient market stories. I recently had occasion 
to run some seminars in Europe on the state of capital markets in 
Europe. One of the more interesting speakers came from Austria. He 
described the Austrian stock exchange. The Austrian Stock 
Exchange consists of 24 stocks. Ninety eight percent of the 
outstanding stocks are owned by two banks. The whole stock 
exchange consists of 3 clerks who keep transactions in large 
ledger books by hand. Every stock is traded every day, because 
if the stock isn't traded, naturally the subsidiary of a bank 
will sell a. share back to the parent of the bank. So we have 
a recorded price each day. The law requires that annual reports 
be reported to the public within 3 years from the close of the 
fiscal year. However, it specifies that if there is any reason 
for not reporting it, such as the director is out of the country 
or one of the directors is ill, you can have an extension of 
from 3 to 5 more additional years before the information is made 
public. There seems to be a large incidence of sickness among 
directors in Austria, so, a typical time lag between the time the 
fiscal year closes and the time the information is reported is
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somewhere between 5 and 8 years. (WN: Does that system work 
any worse than ours?) Well, the efficient market tests show 
that that market is totally efficient. We have run the full set 
of efficient market tests, and we concluded that that is a per­
fectly efficient market.
There are other anomalies going on in the economy such 
that once a year the banks are valued and they are valued according 
to the market value of the securities they hold. The timing 
of the valuation is random, and prices usually double immediately 
before the valuation process. Again, we get efficient market 
tests. So, that while I believe in efficient markets, I think 
we have to be careful in what we mean by efficient markets.
Markets are efficient with respect to the information that is 
reported in the economy. That does not imply that markets could 
not be made more efficient by making the information flow to 
those markets more efficient. I would suggest that the standards 
in Austria do not represent perfect accounting standards, even 
as little as I know about accounting. So, I guess I would, having 
listened to the proceedings this morning, caution against 
believing that,because we find efficiency tests in the United 
States, the auditor’s job is done perfectly and that all information 
which is of potential use to investors is already there.
Another point that struck me had to do with the cost of 
processing information. We have a certain amount of evidence in
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the literature that the investor is able to see through different 
accounting methods, providing we footnote, and make known 
what is going on. There are costs to seeing through alternative 
accounting methods, and it is not clear to me that some of 
these costs are not better borne once and for all by the 
accountant than many, many times by each of the 300,000 investors 
who are sitting out there in the market.
Finally, I return to risk and perhaps make two points.
One is that I see one of the key roles of the auditing function 
as attempting to decrease risk and make the market more efficient 
in that sense. And second of all, I wonder about the possibility— 
and I may be wandering from the auditor's role to the accountant’s 
role—but I wonder about the possibility of making probabilistic 
information available to investors. That is, it seems to me 
that a lot of work goes into taking a certain amount of events, 
which are at best uncertain in nature, and trying to reduce those 
to a single number and throwing away all the information that we 
had to absorb and work with in reducing that to a single number.
It seems to me that this information that we are dealing with in 
portfolio analysis is extremely valuable to investors.
Well, I have listed some more points in my outline, but I 
have covered the ones that I find interesting at this point.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Chairman (DRC): Could you explain to us what you mean 
by decreasing risk?
Discussion Leader (MG): In a portfolio sense, if we are 
holding small portfolios, what we ideally like to be able to
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ascertain or be able to hold are stocks whose price movements 
do not move in unison. If we buy a— in very simplistic terms— 
if we buy a company that runs ski resorts in New England, we 
would also like to buy a company that operates a summer resort 
in New England, to protect ourselves from the variances of 
weather. Gold stocks are typically held out as examples of 
stocks that tend to move counter to other stocks in the economy. 
If we buy a portfolio that is composed totally of automobile 
stocks and companies that sell products which are related to 
automobile sales, we are exposing ourselves to one type of risk 
in the economy.
(RK): How can auditors reduce this kind of risk? 
Discussion Leader (MG): I’m not sure that they can
reduce it, but I believe they can supply information on it.
(MS: Like what?) Well, in recent years, out of the accounting
profession has come, for example, a lot of attempts to measure 
the sensitivity of a company’s earnings to the sensitivity of 
earnings in the economy. That is a valuable piece of information 
reported upon in the economic-financial literature. It might 
be worthwhile thinking about and incorporating that information 
in accounting statements.
(RE): That is an accounting question now, not an
auditing question.
Discussion Leader (MG): Well, I guess I view the role of
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an auditor as saying, not just., has the accountant done his 
job, but what job would I like the accountant to do. Not being 
an auditor, I can’t make that distinction.
(RE): On an individual job basis? In other words you
think...
Discussion Leader (MG): No, set standards across com­
panies for what type of information do I think is relevant for 
investors, and I will be concerned with investors, because 
that is my thing to look at.
(MS): Well, I think it is fair game if we are looking 
at the problem of what extensions of auditing might be useful, 
as we have the whole day. If we constrain ourselves to what is 
the current standard in accounting then we narrow our objective.
I think what is being inferred here is a kind of analysis of a 
sort of a profit variance, based on externalities, macro 
economic factors, perhaps, versus the industry versus the micro.
(RK): That is based on publicly available information.
I could go home and in a week could publish a list of the 
accounting Betas for all publicly traded companies. So, I'm 
not sure that that is a particularly interesting question to 
focus on, because it is basically operating on publicly available
information.
Discussion Leader (MG): Well, it is publicly available 
information. I could walk into Merrill Lynch, for example—
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Merrill Lynch sells rate of return Betas I could walk
into Merrill Lynch and I can buy rate of return Betas. If
I’m an institutional customer, I can purchase an evaluation 
service and pay $80,000 a year in commissions to get that 
service. The question is whether the auditor, who can make 
that service available at considerably less than $80,000 a year 
per customer, should make some of that information available 
to the public.
(EH): I guess we would agree that that is a question.
Discussion Leader (MG): Yes, I’m putting it forth as 
a question; I don't have an answer.
(CW): I have an answer. How much credibility do you
want to attach to what Merrill Lynch publishes, to those 
accounting Betas of all those companies? Do you want our 
certificate on it? Do you want the public to really believe that 
stuff, that those accounting Betas are all alright? What was 
the accounting Beta on Equity Funding?
Discussion Leader (MG); If you are talking about replicable, 
historical information, you have a piece of replicable, historical 
information, now. Do you want to make a value judgment that 
that information is nonsense, and shouldn’t be reported on by 
the accounting profession? I don’t believe that it is nonsense.
(CW): You missed my point. Let me just come around one
more time. One of the things we all hold precious, I think,
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as auditors is the attest function that we are involved in.
If we get involved in things where we are not expert hut
would reflect on our general credibility and get us tangled
up in things that we really aren't able to do very well, it
is going to reflect on the attest function. That is one thing.
Now, so long as we are involved with the attest function, if we
put our name on something like the Merrill Lynch accounting Betas, 
our
what is that going to do to/credibility and the other work we 
are supposed to be doing in the public interest? I guess 
there is an implied answer to my question.
(MSh): I don't think Marty is saying that you should do
that. I think—and maybe I’m adding a little something to 
you Marty, and you may disagree with me, correct me if that is 
the case—I think the substance of Marty's remarks for auditors 
is the following: estimation of Betas is a problem outside the 
realm of auditors, but estimation of Betas may depend on 
accounting information, which could be made more reliable by 
auditors. So that the auditor’s role lies in that.
(EH): I guess that isn’t what we heard.
(MSh): Okay, what did you mean to say, was it something
like I threw back at you now or something different?
Discussion Leader (MO): It is something that perhaps I 
can make clear in this sense. Perhaps I'm expanding the role of 
this group beyond the role that they want to play, but it seems
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to me that the important thing that we have hinted at a
lot this morning, and haven’t really gotten to is, what is the 
value—we are going to talk about cost-benefit analysis, perhaps
in a more restricted sense—but what is the value of information
to the users of information? We can say we believe in the 
efficient market hypothesis, and it doesn’t really matter if 
we expand the information set that is provided. But I think a 
key role that we should be looking at is supplying information that 
is valuable to the users of that information. And if I were an 
auditor, I would want to have some sense of value when I looked 
at what I put my time and cost s into replicating. If a piece 
of information isn’t valuable to users of information, I wouldn’t 
be terribly concerned with making sure that I measured that to 
the penny, whereas if information is extremely valuable, I 
would be concerned with it.
(EH): Would you believe that we attach a tremendous 
sense of value to placing our signature on that single piece 
of paper in which we express an opinion on a set of financial 
statements? Would you believe also that we have no overwhelming 
desire to compete with Merrill Lynch in reporting Betas nor 
do we see a need to do that just because we can do it cheaper?
(JR): I go along with Mel in saying that this highlights
that portfolio constructors, people who construct portfolios, 
the first party investors, want to estimate the expected return
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on a stock and the risk, the systematic risk. Now, not much 
attention—in fact, no attention at all—was paid to the 
uncertainty of information used in making these estimates. 
and I think what follows, within the efficient market findings, 
within the portfolio model, is that the auditor’s role would be— 
the auditor would fulfill a beneficial social function by—reducing, 
improving or enhancing the accuracy of that accounting information 
which goes into the formulation of expected returns and risk.
(CW): Yes, but see what you want to do—what you want 
to do—is to change our role. I didn't go into public 
accounting to become an investment advisor. If I had wanted to 
do that, I would have joined Bill Norby's group. I went into 
this profession thinking that what I would do is be engaged in 
the attest function on historial financial statements, and 
suddenly find that I am being asked to get involved in a whole 
predictability process and that I’m supposed to make all kinds 
of normative judgments, some of which—listening to what has 
gone on here today—aren't even in the financial area. They have 
to do with management performance, best use of assets, etc.
(LL): Chuck, if 10 years from now, the investor is
placing 90% of his reliance upon forecasts instead of historic 
statements, we don't want to be like the guy who was shoeing 
horses when the automobile was coming in.
(CW): We are already doing that, according to the 
empirical accounting research studies. These guys can demonstrate
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that that is already the case. All the annual report does 
is confirm what has gone before. We don't provide all the 
information which is of value; we just provide some little 
part of that that is attested to and confirms what happened 
in the past. That is what I want to do, and I think we can 
do it well. If you make me get into the rest of that, you are 
going to destroy my basic function and my credibility probably.
(MSh): When people cease to believe that you are 
supplying information which is substantially valuable for their 
decision, you won't get paid. That is why, before we can 
answer the question about what auditors do, we have to think 
about the uses to which the information is put, that is, we 
have to think about the decision models of users of information. 
Marty is saying, here are some decision models; one of the 
models deals with estimation of these Betas. He thinks, perhaps, 
that Betas can be estimated using accounting data. If that is 
the case—so so far, you are not in the picture at all yet as 
an auditor—if that is the case, though, where does he get the 
accounting data? Well, presumably he uses data which has been 
audited, and hence the quality and reliability of that data is 
better than if it wasn’t audited when it is used and Betas are 
chosen and decisions are made. So, you are an important guy 
because you are supplying the right information upon which the 
rest of the decision process follows.
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(JR): Otherwise, what is the objective of the attest
function?
(RE): Let me take another crack at it.
(CW): It is to confirm the historical results, period.
I don’t visualize my function as analyzing them, giving you a 
predictability quotient, or anything of the sort.
Discussion Leader (MG): I’m not asking you to analyze 
them, and I'm not asking you to predict in this one instance. 
There may or may not be value there. That is a separate issue. 
What I’m saying is that you should—what I'm asking for is— 
ascertain what aspects of the historical information are 
important to investors.
(GB): What if the answer is none? What evidence would 
you be satisfied with if the answer is yes?
Discussion Leader (MG): Well, I guess I don't believe 
that the answer is none, and I will use your own argument, 
George. If the answer is none, we wouldn't have auditing firms
(GB): You go back to what was just said. The function 
of the auditor, at least in part—I personally believe it is 
almost the whole—is the attest function, namely, to confirm 
what people otherwise know, and further than that, to uncover 
mal-uses of resources. And I completely agree that it is an 
extremely difficult and important function.
Discussion Leader (MG): It is not clear to me that if 
we didn’t have auditors, if we didn't have accountants, that
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they would know that. And one of the reasons people know it, 
one of the reason things are made public, is because that 
auditor's statement is going to come out.
(WN): You could have nonaudited statements, and the 
information of a sort would be out.
Discussion Leader (MG): It might not be out as accurately 
as it would be in the presence of auditors.
(WN): Okay, that is the marginal value of the audit, per se
(GB): Shall we move to a situation where we audit every 
other year? Is that enough of a discipline on the system?
(MSh): That is a matter of costs and benefits. In 
other words, I think that the big point which Marty is making is 
the tradeoff Betas and that kind of thing. The big point, if 
I can generalize this a little bit,is this: that it is 
important for auditors to be aware of how users make use of 
audited information, that is, be aware of what are the decision 
models, the decision processes. You don't have to invent the 
decision models, but you should be aware of them. Aware of 
what is going on. And if these in fact are the decision processes 
being used, and if you supply—as I believe auditors do supply— 
key Information which is part of that process, then you are 
playing an extremely important role. The attest function is 
probably very important
(EH): Excuse me, can I interrupt a minute? I think it
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is fair to say that we auditors do not believe we supply
any information except information as to the credibility of 
information supplied by somebody else. Is there any auditor 
here who disagrees with that?
(MSh): That is worth a lot, though
(EH): Fine, but that really, I think, is not the way 
in which you were using the expression, "supply information."
(JR): "Supply information on the accuracy of that
information," what does it mean otherwise to confirm?
(WN): When you look at the accounting profession, which 
includes auditing and accounting standards, the accounting 
standards are certainly having a lot to do with the kind of 
information being supplied.
(LL): We have some small practitioners who don't under­
stand what you Just said.
(EH): Setting accounting standards is a job which we all 
recognize has been delegated to the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board, which is not part of the accounting profession. We are 
talking here today about auditors as auditors, but not always.
More often we slip over and talk to the question of what the 
accounting principles should be, what information should be 
provided by financial statements? And this is at the heart of 
a great deal of the difficulty we have.
(JR): Are you saying a different thing? You are confirming
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historical results. You would agree to that definition?
Now, what does that mean to "confirm?” To confirm means
that you are providing, as far as I’m concerned, to me, as 
an investor, information on the accuracy of that information.
Now, if that is the case, and if...
(EH): Right, but not as to the content of that 
information.
(JR); Well, I find it difficult to talk about accuracy 
of information devoid or regardless of content.
(EH): I’m sure you find it difficult, yet it is
necessary.
(JR): But if that information is purely historical,
then investors will not need any information on accuracy. The 
only reason that investors need that historical information is 
because it is of value to future decisions and therefore to
prediction.
(MFC); This may be a digression, but what you said 
raises the point for me. You said that the auditor doesn’t 
supply information. Well, I suppose, when he writes the 
"subject to" opinion, he may be supplying some information.
(EH): Well, he is supplying information about information
(MFC): Right, exactly. And to choose another example 
I know we have Sandy Burton saying that the auditor is a partner, 
at least,in the sense of determining the form in which infor-
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mation is provided. Would you accept that view? If you 
accept that view, then there is an auditing role.
(EH): Not necessarily. I may not sound this way, 
but I'm willing to see the auditing role expanded in any 
reasonable direction and to any reasonable extent. I'm 
also insistent that, as we do that, we gear our thinking 
to a distinction between, on the one hand, the identification 
of the information that is to be presented and the question 
of what we are proceeding under, as companies present that 
information, and, on the other hand, the obligation of the 
auditor in the attest function, which is not to decide what 
has to be presented but rather to decide whether that which 
is presented meets certain identified standards of accuracy or
whatever.
(JR): How do you make materiality decisions?
(EH): With great difficulty. We hope that in the fullness 
of time we will have some advice from the FASB under its current 
project.
(GS): Well, in the meantime, we have the obligation to 
decide what fairly present is.
(EH): "Fairly present" means in conformity with GAAP.
(GS): I understand, but there are many gaps in GAAP, so 
that we have to make the decisions. The decisions that we
generally make are not those that GAAP specifically identifies 
but those that fall within the cracks of GAAP. And in that 
sense, let’s just explore what Marty says, it may have certain
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implications for auditing. And I don’t know but I'm just
raising that as a question, in the following sense. It
may have implications in the sense of what we as auditors
are willing to allow to be lumped together, to be aggregated 
together, or what we insist is reported separately. And 
there I think that we could decide that, for instance, an assess­
ment of how things vary in relation to the industry or the economy 
would lead to certain suggestions, namely, that things that 
vary in—certain activities—that tend to vary differently in 
relation to the economy and the industry must be separately 
set forth and can’t be lumped together with those things that 
vary in the same general way as the economy or industry which 
can be lumped together. I would say that if that is an 
important thing, then by lumping all different things that 
vary in different ways in terms of the industry—and let's not 
talk about Betas or anything else—we say now that really 
wouldn't fairly present. Can that give us some guide as to 
the level of classification or disaggregation which we are
going to insist upon or which we are going to allow and so on?
That is not far beyond our role as auditors.
(EH): I really can't respond to that, because it was
much too long a question, but my friend Mr. Werner apparently 
understood it. So I will defer to him.
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(CW): What George is suggesting, for example, is that 
we take a part public companies’ earning statements and 
disaggregate the data, for example, on discretionary costs, 
and provide that information—just so the academics understand 
what it is we are saying as auditors. But what I don’t want 
to do is come up with a value judgment at bottom. I think 
that Betas are out. I’m perfectly willing to break this data 
a part and report as facts.
(GS) : Chuck, I agree with you 100 percent, because 
essentially the financial statements are only part of the 
information about a company and they are the part about the 
actual activities of a concern which you really can't pick up 
from other—well, not as effectively—from other sources. But,
I think, we must pay some attention to how these are packaged, 
how they are aggregated, how they are disaggregated, and 
what fairly presents about those—that limited set—and thus,
I think, we must pay some attention to these issues that Marty
raised.
(CW): Yes, I agree; I will go this far with you. We 
do package in the earnings statement uncertain income, uncertain 
revenues. Things that are very close to a cash term we package 
with things that are very far from cash, and I think, indeed, 
that we should start to disaggregate those things. But if you 
want from me predictability and interpretation, that is what 
I don't want to do; I don't think that is my business.
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(WN): Well, the president of the AICPA is suggesting 
that maybe that is the next role of the auditor.
Chairman (DRC): No, he didn't, not in his last speech.
In his last speech, he said that management should furnish the 
interpretation and that the auditor might read and review 
that but would not interpret the data.
(WN): My statement was accurate with respect to a 
certain point in time.
(EH): Bill, maybe somebody talked to him in the 
meantime.
Chairman (DRC): The speech that was published in the last 
issue of the Journal, the last one he made.
(RE): May I ask a question that I think is about what 
Marty is talking about? If you look at the way information 
comes in to the prices reflected in the market and so forth, 
we have a situation here where accounting represents only a 
small part of the information that goes into the valuation of 
securities. The question is one that hasn’t been addressed 
except by Chuck and then in the negative sense of saying that he 
didn't want to go beyond the historical information that is 
disclosed. Let’s say that, on a scale of 0 to 100, 100 percent 
of the information enters into security prices and that we 
auditors are now working on 10 or 20 percent of it or whatever 
percentage you care to use to reduce the uncertainty connected
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with that. That is fine; if that is what we do today, let’s 
forget that. The questions that I think you have to ask are:
Is there a role for the auditor in reducing the uncertainty 
connected with the other 80% of the information which enters 
into market prices? And if the auditor is the most efficient 
way to reduce uncertainty with respect to one part of the 
information set—that is, he can do it once for the benefit 
of all stockholders—is there theoretically any reason why he 
shouldn't be exercising the same type of efficient reduction 
of uncertainty with respect to the rest of the information set? 
Now, Chuck has expressed clearly his view that he as an auditor 
doesn’t want to get beyond the part of the information that he 
deals with but I as a practitioner would like to state that I 
represent, maybe a different constituency among practitioners 
who feel not only that they would like to get involved with the
rest of this information set but also that the financial 
information is becoming less and less relevant and that I, 
personally—I'm fairly young, as you can see—am not interested 
in being in a buggy-whip industry. I think that our future
is in the rest of the information set. I think that that is 
implicit in this whole market pricing question, and we haven't 
really addressed that.
Chairman (DRC): You have to perceive it properly because 
now in the current moral climate, S and M are coming in and 
whips are coming back.
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(RE ): Well, I don't think it's going to be as big 
a market as...
(RK): One of the problems we are encountering here
is called the "kinky" demand curve
Chairman (DRC): That was really a lead into a break; 
we need a break. Let’s take a five-minute break.
Chairman (DRC): I promised to allow a couple of 
people to comment, before we move to cost-benefit analysis.
Bob, do you want to say something?
(RH): The reason I wanted to get it in here was that 
it ties in with portfolio context in the sense that if we do 
look at the auditor as someone who is trying to minimize the 
possibility of a report being issued that is fraudulent or 
something such as that, individuals, in a portfolio context, 
may be able to diversify away from that same type of risk. 
Although I know of no research looking into that question, it 
would seem to be a very logical way to approach the issue.
In the same sense that in the portfolio context, as far as the 
underlying business risks to the firm are concerned, we can 
diversify away from a lot of that. If we have a sufficient 
spreading and the same kind of context for the risk of reporting 
errors, we may not have as big a problem as we think, if we 
can find diversification to reduce that risk.
Discussion Leader (MG): Individuals can diversify away
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reporting errors. At the same time, although that takes
some of the had effects away from reporting errors, it
doesn't mean that we are, as well off whether we have reporting 
errors or not, because in that capital asset pricing is the 
amount of risk in the market and the market price of risk.
If we have more errors across the economy, we don't worry 
about them. What you are doing is changing the amount of risk.
(RH): I guess what that would seem to convey, then,
would be that we would want to look at the average level of 
risk instead of looking at specific firms. Much like portfolio 
analysis suggests that we shouldn't be spending a lot of money 
looking for underpriced stocks, maybe we are spending too much 
money looking for the Equity Funding, looking for those kinds 
of frauds, when we should concentrate more on specifying some 
average level of risk that we want to exist in the economy for 
reporting errors and designing auditing standards that should 
try to accomplish the realization of that average level of risk.
Discussion Leader (MG): I think this gets into the 
cost-benefit analysis, and perhaps one point I did not make as 
well as I would have liked to, which is the fact that the auditor 
really has a scarce resource to allocate, namely, his time or 
the amount of money he has to work with. I meant my brief talk 
in part to be a plea for trying to discover where that scarce 
resource was best spent, the areas in which we are most concerned 
with eliminating errors.
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THE COST BENEFIT ASPECTS OF THE AUDIT FUNCTION
Outline of Issues: Prepared by Robert K. Elliott
I. Background
A. The cost-benefit aspect of the auditing function has 
not been clearly defined.
B. Research on this subject is badly needed.
1. Benefits have not been fully identified, much 
less quantified.
2. Nonauditee users, who constitute the bulk of 
the consumers of the audit product, rarely in   
today’s audit practice contribute directly to 
the payment for the audit.
II. Further research is necessary to precisely define cost- 
benefit relationships, but the following specific items 
are readily identifiable:
A. Costs
1. Auditors' salaries, fringe benefits, overhead, 
and profit, which are typically paid by auditees.
2. Disruption in normal routines of audited entities, 
which are typically absorbed by auditees.
3. Additional records and systems that are required 
to satisfy auditability requirements, which are 
incurred by auditees.
4. Litigation costs (as distinguished from awards) 
arising as a consequence of audits, which may be 
incurred by both auditors and auditees. (Litig­
ation awards may wind up being costs to auditors 
and auditees and benefits to users.)
5. Losses incurred by information users that result 
from reliance on information because it had been 
audited but nevertheless was erroneous.
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B. Benefits
1. Improvement in decision outcomes that result 
from the increased usefulness of information 
that has been audited, which accrues to inform­
ation users.
2. Improved allocation of economic resources, 
which accrues to all members of society.
3. Motivational impacts of an audit. Auditee per­
sonnel may make greater effort to avoid intentional 
or unintentional errors if they know their work 
will be audited. This benefit, which involves 
both the improvement in the accuracy of information 
and reduction in losses from defalcations, is 
shared by the information users and auditees.
4. Professional advice provided by auditors. During 
the course of audits, auditors often assist 
auditees by identifying ways to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the audited entities 
Assuming that action taken as a result of auditors’ 
advice causes no impairment of auditors' inde­
pendence, this benefit accrues to auditees with
no cost to information users.
Chairman, Douglas R. Carmichael
Bob, can you give us a brief background on your work 
on cost-benefit analysis?
Discussion Leader, Robert K. Elliott
Well, I feel that I have a definite advantage here over
the three individuals who led the previous sessions, in that 
in each case, there was a body of research and there were facts 
established by the research. I’m in an area where there has 
basically been nothing done, and therefore almost anything I 
say is, at least, plausible. That is a part of my problem.
So many of the discussions that have come up today at one 
point or another, we get back to the question of the cost of
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having audit involvement in these areas versus the benefits.
So, my section here is to look a little bit more explicitly 
at this question of costs and benefits.
The costs to some extent are defined, and I have got 
them listed here under costs, at least some of the ones that 
you can clearly think of. There may be other costs, too, 
that aren’t so obvious. There are costs that companies have, 
for example, when by divulging more and more information, 
they give their competitors advantages over them, and those 
costs, opportunity costs and so forth aren't captured here.
But at least the direct costs are here, and these include 
auditors’ salaries and fringes, and so forth, in the form 
of fees. Although this audit benefit is really for the bene­
fit of not only the present owners of a company but also future 
owners and, in some respects, society at large, the fee is 
nevertheless borne on behalf of all those people by the com­
pany itself. Now I understand that one of the issues under 
consideration is the way in which this function should be 
financed, but at least presently, auditees pay these fees.
So that is one of the costs.
Another one, which is not negligible, is disruption 
in the work routines of the auditees, because we come in 
and ask a lot of questions and disturb the general routine. 
There is some cost there, which I suppose, if you wanted 
to investigate, you could get an order of magnitude
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estimate on that. There are systems that companies maintain 
that they probably wouldn’t maintain at all if they didn’t 
know that we were going to come along and audit them, so, 
these are costs which are imposed. There may be offsetting 
benefits there, too, because management may get some benefit 
in terms of better information internally, but at least there 
is a cost in maintaining these systems. There are litigation 
costs, which may be borne by the auditors, may be borne by some 
of the others, but these are certainly some of the quantifiable 
costs involved because of the attest function.
There are losses that information users incur, because 
they rely on information that they thought the auditor had gotten 
the imprecision out of but in fact had not. Those costs are 
getting into the realm where they are pretty difficult to measure 
For example, let’s say that through an audit error in a very 
simple case, the financial statements were wrong and I, as one 
owner of a company made $10,000 that objectively I shouldn’t and 
Doug lost $10,000 because he was on the other side. What is the 
cost involved there? It is not necessarily $10,000 because to the
rest of you there was no cost or benefit. It is only between 
the two of us and the distribution of our resources, so it is 
a little difficult to put a number on that cost that means 
anything relative to the broader picture of how society costs 
out this audit function. Well, those are some of the costs.
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On the benefits side, the benefits are more nebulous 
than the costs in general, I suppose, if you want to get down 
to a quantification. But there is the improvement in decision 
outcomes that comes from having better quality of information 
available through the audit process, and this benefit goes to 
the owners of the securities, basically, present and potential, 
as they get into it. There is the improved allocation of economic 
resources because, after all, the grand total of all the indi­
vidual investment decisions represents the macro-economic in­
vestment decision and to the extent that that is a better decision 
in the aggregate, that benefit accrues to all the citizens, 
whether or not they are stockholders. There are motivational 
impacts of an audit which I have referred to earlier today as a 
deterrent effect. In many cases, management will behave dif­
ferently because they know that their actions are subject to 
review annually, and any discrepancies will be publicized, and 
that is a very significant benefit which is shared by really 
the information users and to some extent the companies being
audited themselves.
Then there is the fourth one, which is a side benefit, 
and that is that the auditors are experienced because they 
go around and see many different companies and typically 
what they do when they look at an individual entity that 
they are auditing, if they see inefficiencies or poor 
business practices, they will point these out. There is very
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little additional cost involved in doing this, hut there may 
be a significant benefit to the auditees in terms of the 
efficiency of their operations, assuming that the auditor 
doesn’t in some way lose some independence by this by making 
suggestions which then later put him in a position of having 
to report on the implementation of his suggestion. And you 
have all these independence questions, which most of us who 
are in auditing feel do not significantly detract from inde­
pendence, but nevertheless, the perceptions of outsiders are 
also important here and have to be considered. So, there is 
that possibility there.
Really, these costs benefits are different enough 
to quantify, but even if we could quantify them, we might not 
be able to answer all of these audit questions, because we 
can’t really make decisions here unless we have some set of 
values that we are trying to work to as a society. Now, let 
me give you an example. In a socialist economy, where all 
the resources are owned by the government for the benefit of 
the people, the resource distribution question—who owns the 
resources—is not even a question that comes up because there 
are no shareholders, per se, no trading going on. So, the 
information errors don’t really distribute assets erroneously 
between Doug and myself at all. So, that aspect doesn't even 
come up in a socialist economy, whereas in a capitalist economy
-194-
that is a significant aspect of it. Obviously, in those two 
different types of economies, you would be paying for dif­
ferent purposes for having audits. Now, most types of 
economies do have an attest function, an audit function, 
but they are there for different reasons.
So, really, there ,are basically these two outcomes 
of having audits, as I see it, at least. The first is the 
question that the improved reliability of information 
results in better resource allocation over the whole economy, 
and those benefits go to everybody. The second is that 
auditing reduces the misallocation of income and wealth 
between individuals, that just come up because of either 
random or deliberate fraudulent errors in reporting by 
companies. If you are going to make cost-benefit choices, 
you have got to decide between the two of those, because in 
some cases, they are inconsistent.
Let me give you an example which already came up 
today, and that is the question of: should the auditor 
act as insurer against investment risks? The basic concept 
here is that the auditor is in a position to indemnify 
those who made wrong decisions based on information errors in 
the financial statement—let’s say he has got to pay out X 
dollars per year for that purpose. So, all the auditor has 
got to do is divide that up, add it to his fee as in effect, 
an insurance premium on top of the fee, charge it, and he will 
act as a sort of the Blue Cross of the investment world. He
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will collect from everybody and distribute to those who suffer 
a loss. Well, that has been seriously proposed, I guess, 
by some people. But what you have to look at is that that 
view of things really very much goes toward the second of 
the functions that I have outlined, that of minimizing irrational 
redistributions of wealth based on bum accounting data. The 
other side of it, if you look at the resource allocation ques­
tion across the economy, is that if the auditor is. an insurer 
against investment risks, such that all investment risks are 
reduced, in fact, if they are ultimately insured against all 
risk, all securities would sell at the same price as Treasury 
Bills, because they would all have virtually no risk. In this 
type of case, where all investments sell at the same risk level, 
there is no incentive to people to invest in things which are 
socially beneficial or which maximize—whatever you want to 
maximize, GNP, or whatever—and so therefore if we insure it 
to too great an extent against investment risk, which helps 
them on one side of this equation, we may in fact degrade the 
performance of the economy as a whole in terms of the way in 
which it allocates resources. And so therefore, you have to 
decide, when making the cost-benefit trade-offs, which of 
those two is more important to you.
If you look at the way the courts and the SEC are 
operating, it is clear that they prefer to minimize individual 
investment risks. In other words, if you look at all the 
litigation here, you find that it is between people who feel
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that they have been had. In most cases, a plaintiff is 
coming in and saying,” I lost money because of bad 
information, so I want to recover it from somebody.”
All of this legal activity really is to minimize this 
random redistribution of wealth because of accounting 
errors, and we really don't see much activity in the legal 
sense aimed at the resource allocation question. But, 
given that we have to make some choices in this area, we 
really can't do it in the absence of some societal goals
and values.
So, it just seems to me that in answering these ques­
tions about what is the proper role of the auditor, we can't 
ask them in a vacuum, but we have to ask them with respect to 
some defined goals that we have within the economy as a whole. 
It depends on how those choices come out, and I really don’t 
think that It is the proper role of auditors to make those 
choices. I think that that is the political process, as to 
what are the important things going on, and it is based on 
that process that the proper role of auditing, among many 
other things, has got to be determined.
So, about all I have done here is to list off some of 
the costs and benefits in a qualitative sense as a basis to 
get the discussion rolling, but there has been very little work 
done in this area that would help us to quantify these at the 
present time.
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General Discussion
(MSh): Bob, I think that you presented a pretty clear 
statement about some things that we have talked about this 
morning and kind of dropped. For one thing, I think you are 
saying that we really have to look at the whole economic 
system, given that we will never make it all the way from that 
up until what the auditor should do, within say, the life of 
this Commission. Even that being the case, I still think we 
would do better in terms of anything the Commission might come 
out with at this point, if we keep that in mind. Because just 
because we don’t have a strong handle on this whole economic 
process, that is not to say that we don’t know something about 
it. We do know quite a bit about, at least in terms of an 
outline, how information is, or could be plausibly used. We 
can't prove it; we can talk about how information may well be 
plausibly used in the overall question of resource allocation 
in the national economy. We have to keep that in mind because, 
as soon as we talk about the auditor's role, we are starting to 
compartmentalize.
Let’s look at the total flow of information because you 
can’t completely ignore the question of what is happening in the
overall system when you are an auditor. Nobody is going to tell 
you that this is what you are supposed to do, and you wouldn’t 
be content in simply doing it, because nobody is smart enough 
to tell you what you should do. On the other hand, I don't
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think an auditor would want to be totally relegated to that 
situation. The plain fact is that the boundaries of auditing 
cannot be precisely defined anymore than the total understanding 
of the overall system can be defined. But, having said on the 
one hand that we can’t do it, on the other hand, I think we can, 
because I think we do know enough about the overall economic 
process I think we can trace—certainly conceptually—and I 
think we can slowly begin to quantify. We can trace the flow 
of information. We can talk about how firms make capital 
budgeting decisions. We can talk about how capital markets 
provide capital through efficient terms. We can talk about the 
role of information in this process. Then, we can talk about, 
how do we insure the reliability of this information, which is 
getting closer to what the auditor is after.
But I think that in order to talk very practically 
about what the auditor really does, we really can't ignore the 
overall process. That is one of the things I read in your 
statement and that is that whatever comes out about what the 
auditor does, unless it tries, even imperfectly, to relate this 
to the question of the overall resource allocation in the economy, 
we are not going to be able to make our best efforts at this
definition. At least we should feel that it is consistent with 
whatever understanding we have about resource allocation in the
economy.
Discussion Leader (BE): You can’t do that without some
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reasonably explicit statement about what you are trying
to accomplish.
(MSh): Well, you can do that. Let's say you want 
to maximize GNP, then you talk about how is GNP generated 
and it is a long chain.
Discussion Leader (PE): Let’s take the assumption that 
what you want to do is maximize GNP. Therefore, you are 
interested in optimal resource allocation; you really don't 
care who owns the resources. That is what you said; that is 
your only objective. You really don't care who owns them.
(MSh): Suppose you list several objectives. You might 
list maximize GNP, and you might talk about...
Discussion Leader (RE): You might but that is my point. 
You can't make these decisions unless you are willing to state 
what you are trying to maximize or optimize.
(MSh): Right, you have to list all your goals. You
are saying, okay, that the minimum goals have to do with 
generation of total wealth and distribution of wealth.
Discussion Leader (RE): They are two that you can think 
of pretty quickly.
(MSh): Yes, but as you and I have talked privately on 
other occasions, the question of distribution may be of less 
importance if everybody holds a diversified portfolio.
Discussion Leader (RE): That is right. You can diversify 
away the risk, but the whole legal system acts as if we were
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doing exactly the opposite. It is holding us accountable for
individual risks—when the market—when all this information
we are talking about--George and Bob and Marty all bring up 
information—which tells us that, as a public policy matter, 
that is probably misdirected.
(MSh): Well, maybe you can convince everybody to get off 
the hook and say: "Look, everybody should have diversified 
portfolios. That being the case, don't sue us when we go 
wrong on one company, as long as we apply the reasonable princi­
ples that have been agreed to.”
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, one of the things I think 
that would be okay in some sense is to say that it is up to 
people to diversify away their risk, but, on the other hand, I 
think the auditor has to be faced with some possible penalties 
to give him the incentive to do a good Job. Now, maybe what 
you want to say is, that instead of having this random system 
where plaintiffs, if they happen to prevail in court, can 
collect from the auditor and that provides the incentives, 
maybe you ought to say, ’’the hell with it, investors can never 
collect" but we will set up a fine system—the government will 
collect a fine if they find auditors misperforming. Now, there 
are other ways to structure this, and although the Cohen 
Commission does not have the authority—at least it is not 
obvious that they have the authority—to change the legal system
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in this country, at least if they make observations along 
these lines, presumably that might have an impact on future 
developments. But if they don’t make any observations at 
all in this regard, then there is no hope that they would 
have that type of influence on future developments. This is 
to some extent, I guess, a little too abstract.
The problem—getting back down to the decisions that 
the Commission has within their range—the problem is this.
They have identified a group of issues: Should the auditor 
be responsible to detect management fraud? Should the auditor
address himself to interim financial statements? and so on 
and so forth. There is a group of issues, and they are 
outlined in that booklet. The problem is that if you look 
at these things strictly from a standpoint of moralistic 
reasoning, you could say: ’’well, fraud is bad, objectively 
bad in our value-system; we don’t want it, so the auditors ought 
to find it. So, let's vote, and we find that the vote is 7 to 
nothing on the Commission that the auditor is responsible for 
fraud.” Now, that could be done; and they could resolve all 
the issues like that and probably could dispense with them in 
one long meeting. But, does that make any sense without at 
least considering, what are the costs associated with finding 
this? So, it is in that sense that I think you have to address 
this cost problem. What does it actually cost? Chuck mentioned
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a figure, that we spend a. billion dollars on auditing a, year.
I think that that is a lower limit, certainly. (CW: Public 
Companies) Well, I think that is low, even for public 
companies. We spend a hell of a lot of money on this.
Suppose we said, "let’s get into quarterly auditing, finding 
fraud and so forth," and to do this, we would have to spend 
another 2 billion dollars a year, which would imply, if 
Chuck’s figure is right, that we would have to go out and buy 
another quarter of a million auditors. There is nothing too 
difficult about that; we could do that in about six months.
(JR): Relative to the Defense budget, this is nothing.
(CW): A quarter of a million competent auditors?
Discussion Leader (RE): No, just the same as today.
My point is that it is too easy to resolve these questions 
on a moralistic basis without considering whether the cost 
is justified to do this, and if we could only get our hands on 
some of these costs and benefits, maybe we could at least make 
decisions that, although they weren’t scientific, were
reasonable.
(MS): We have danced around one thing quite a bit here 
today, and I think this might be a time to get to it. Forget 
the fraud, let’s get back to the illegal payment bit. We 
sort of touched on it and left. On the cost-benefit notion, 
recognizing, I think we hear, that the securities market and 
their model is unaffected by disclosure of illegal payments,
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at least, so I heard. So, the benefit to the security holder 
is almost zero. You certainly have costs in pursuing this.
How do you resolve this issue on what involvement the 
auditor should have in illegal payments, if you try to lean 
on the cost and benefit model for guidance so that this 
Commission can take a position on the specific issue of 
disclosure of illegal payments? Let’s address that specific 
one because it is with us. It was mentioned earlier, and I 
think we sort of walked away.
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, on the cost side, we 
could probably cost it out. So, the real question is, what
is the benefit?
(RK): It would possibly be a function of the level of
payments you want to detect. If you want to detect a 20 million 
dollar payment to a corporation, that will cost a certain 
amount. If you want to detect a $1,000 payment, that will 
cost somewhat more. So, there is a whole envelope of cost 
functions, depending upon the level of payment you want to 
detect.
(MS): I would like to hear about the benefit, parti­
cularly to the security holder, the analyst, if there is a 
benefit there. Or else are we looking for other kinds of 
benefits, if there are any, if they can be determined? Do we 
have something with costs and no benefits? Won’t most of our
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problem areas be in this kind of a situation?
(LL): Does the disclosure bring further costs or, rather, 
does it bring benefits or just further costs?
(MS): If there are more costs then we will stay on the
cost side. I’m searching for a benefit for someone.
(WN): I think that as you say, that the disclosure
of these illegal payments does not seem to have any perceptible 
effect on the market; but, of course, there are a lot of 
other effects, a lot of other forces in the market at any one 
time, so it is hard to sort them out. We have a questionnaire 
in process among analysts, so we can get a little clue on it.
I think in general, it has not had much effect. However, I 
would say that investors would probably rather invest in 
companies that do business the right way than the wrong way.
(MS): I have some question on that, because of the 
history of those companies which limited their portfolios to 
investments in companies which were concerned with environmental 
conditions and the rest. They didn't quite make it. So you 
say there is a preference to the investor in an "honest” versus 
a ’’dishonest” management.
(WN): I assumed all other things being equal.
(MS): Even other things being equal, I raise the 
question. This enters into the decision model.
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(WN): Let me finish. I think that the substantive
question here is the right of the corporation to exist in 
a private enterprise economy in which the public has con­
fidence in it carrying out its operations in what it regards 
as an ethical manner. Now, the standards of ethics are 
going to change; and I think we have had a change here in 
what we regard as proper all of a sudden in terms of these 
kinds of payments to do business abroad. Maybe the next 
focus will be on payments we make to do business within the
United States.
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(MFC): They are in the works and will be coming out
very soon.
(WN): So, the security holder has an indirect interest
in maintaining a private corporation with a franchise to do 
business, and if society demands that corporations be audited 
to prove their ethical behavior, well then that is what you 
are going to have to pay for. That is about the size of it, 
as I see it.
(MFC): In the taxi ride down here today, which Bill 
and I shared, either he or I posed the example of a company 
whose business in a particular area, was declining and it just 
couldn’t compete very effectively with its competitors. They 
were considering closing the plant and putting 1,000 people 
out of work, and then someone suggested that if you take care 
of the purchasing agent of X,Y and Z companies, perhaps you 
could get some business. So, you have got the ethical question 
of is it illegal, or is it bribery? On the other hand, you 
would be putting 1,000 people out of work. And what does 
management do with that? Now, obviously that is a strange 
example, but it was used for our discussion down here in 20
minutes.
Discussion Leader (RE): It goes back to the statement 
of objectives. If you take as objectives maximization of GNP 
and minimization of distributional anomalies of wealth, you
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can't measure any benefit of honesty or dishonesty against 
those two objectives. If you had a further societal objective 
that we want to have some ethical standards, I think that is 
a value statement, that it is fine,  and the people will 
probably vote for that, but then the benefits have to be 
measured against that, which is not a financial type of benefit 
at all. It is a separate societal benefit.
(DRC): There is the other side of it. There is one 
valid point raised about the corporate accountability system 
and the fact that when the means are used for one purpose, the 
corporation does lose control. The only case that I'm aware 
of that is public where that was true was Exxon, where the 
improper or illegal payments duly authorized by the corporation 
were exceeded in the Italian subsidiary by the payments that 
the head of the subsidiary went ahead and made on his own, 
unknown to the corporate hierarchy, using essentially the same 
means of payment as the authorized payment. So, the loss of 
accountability is a fact. I wouldn't necessarily equate that, 
as the SEC has, with materiality, in saying that because of 
that it is automatically material, but I think it is an 
important factor.
(MFC): This morning's Wall Street Journal had a story
about Firestone Rubber. Which has all of that and a whole lot 
more—I mean General Tire, sorry.
(GB): In terms of the benefits, looking at it very
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positively and not making any value judgments, I think one can 
identify a number of benefits in terms of illegal payments.
One is the externality so far as the nation is concerned, 
namely, what is the benefit of not permitting Lockheed to 
bribe Japanese officials? And I refer to Edwin Reichauer’s 
column in Newsweek last week in which he points out that this 
is so contrary to accepted behavior in Japan, that it has caused 
the government to topple and, indeed, is very seriously 
detrimental to our relationship with that country. Now, that 
is an externality; it affects the rest of us, even though it 
may be in Lockheed's own benefit to have made the bribery.
But then that becomes not something that an auditor is 
concerned with, it is something the State Department is 
concerned with. It has something to do with U.S. foreign policy; 
and there should be a role for the people who are charged with 
that responsibility. I didn’t know that the SEC was in the 
foreign policy department, and I rather wonder whether it is 
their governmental responsibility to be concerned with that, 
although it may very well be Department of State’s responsibility. 
The second benefit has to do with the thing that Doug mentioned, 
namely, that it would mean a violation of internal control and 
thereby a possibility that the corporation is out of control. 
Another benefit is also' a question of the violation of the ethics 
of a specific group of people.
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, that comes back to value; you
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said you were excluding values—
(GB): No, no, I’m exluding my values. I'm not
making a personal value judgment on it, but I’m saying 
value judgments then enter into it. It may be horrendous 
for some groups of people to believe that governments ought to 
operate in a certain way, and they want to impose these 
values on the rest of society. They feel this very strongly. 
This is true of things like smoking marihuana, smoking 
cigarettes, abortions, divorce, you name it. There is a whole 
range of values that people want to impose on other people, 
because they feel them very strongly. And then you have 
one other thing and that is the question of the police 
requirement. At our conference that Doug was at in Rochester,of the SEC
Lloyd Feller mentioned that he thought it was a citizen’s 
responsibility (I hope I’m not misquoting. I mentioned Doug 
because I don’t want to misquote someone who isn't here.
Someone who is here can defend themselves.) to see to it that 
the laws of the nation are upheld. That is to say, any 
miscreant is brought to the bar of justice. So, if you see a 
crime being committed, you are required as a citizen to report 
that act to the police authorities. In that case, the auditors 
now become—if that is correct—an arm of the police authorities, 
and have the responsibilities of operating as a policeman. That 
bears cost, of course.
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(DRC): Mr. Feller, didn't say that exactly. He said 
that his position was that silence—given knowledge of the 
crime—silence he thought was a crime.
(GB): How is that different?
(DRC): No, I wasn't saying it was different. I just 
wanted to interject the fact that there is a substantial body 
of opinion on the other side. Silence alone is not an 
affirmative enough action to constitute a crime. But he 
did say that.
(GB): These are some of the benefits against which we
match the costs, but I can't see any other benefits.
(JR): Doesn't an illegal payment impose a potential 
legal cost on the firm and thus become also a private benefit, in 
that sense?
Discussion Leader (RE): But, in most cases, the reason 
we haven't looked at these illegal payments is that, when you 
see these companies, confessing and settling—you know they 
paid in a million dollars to a presidential election fund and 
they were caught and forced to cough up a $10,000 fine—these 
things are not important on the basis of financial materiality 
in most cases. If you look even at bribes in foreign countries 
and you say,"well, holy mackerel, we could get kicked out of
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the country altogether.” That has been going on this way—this 
is the way they have been doing business—for 50 years. They 
have never yet been kicked out. So, what is the magnitude of 
the risk if we don’t disclose it? It only happens if we 
disclose it. So, from a financial point of view, these things 
may not be material enough to bother about. And if we are 
interested in these because of financial materiality, how about 
violations of all other laws which have possible monetary 
effects—violations of anti-trust laws, and pricing, you 
name it?
(JR): Legal enforcement disincentives are not adequate.
Discussion Leader (RE): That is not our problem as 
auditors, but it is probably a true statement from the legal 
point of view.
(WN): Some people think those things ought to be 
audited, too.
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, the problem is whether 
we should be the ones to audit them or not. And that brings up 
the question of the availability of information. The lawyers 
feel strongly that they don’t want their confidence violated 
because they feel that they can’t do a decent job where their 
clients feel that if they divulge any information, the lawyers 
are going to run down to the police department. We have 
precisely the same situation. We are operating in a situation
-212-
where we have a great deal of cooperation, in that our clients— 
when we ask them for something—they are forthcoming with 
the information. If they thought that we were arms of the 
district attorney, we would in effect be able to get only 
information out of them that we are able to subpena, or 
something very closely akin to it. So, you have to say,
"well, what is the benefit here in terms of extensions of 
police state, police powers, versus the costs in the reduction 
of value in the audit function" because now no one will cooperate 
with auditors anymore. So, that is a cost-benefit tradeoff, also
(MSh): That brings up the fact that there is a wide
variety of values and goals being held by a wide variety of 
parties. When you try to take a hard look to at least identify 
them, you realize all the conflicts that are going on. It may 
be that one should simply look for those kind of values and 
goals which can be agreed on, on a consensus basis. Those may 
be very limited, may only be one or two or three, and for that 
kind of thing, the Commission can say that yes, auditors 
should do this, and the rest of it has to be left open, left 
up for, perhaps, Just a general values, cultural, ethical 
principles which pervade in society and left to an individual 
auditor, in an individual case acting as a. professional, 
because professional has all this in it, to decide for himself.
We may not be able to lay out ground rules covering all of these 
values. Maybe if you Just come up with some ground rules on a
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few that we could get a consensus on, that in itself would be a 
big step forward.
(GS): It seems to me, Bob—I’m sorry.
(PR): I don't know if this is changing the focus
of the discussion, but I was very much interested in the
remark that Bob made about who should define the role of the
auditor. If I got it down correctly, you said that it shouldn't 
be auditors; perhaps auditors might be in on it, but that others 
ought to define his role.
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, what I meant Paul was 
that I don't think it is up to auditors to decide that our 
function is to improve the level of honesty of business transac­
tions in the American economy. If that is a role of auditors,
I think it should be dictated to us by legislation or by 
Judicial means but we auditors shouldn’t sit around saying that 
I think it would be nice if business proceeded ethically, so 
we are going to take it on ourselves to audit for that.
(PR): I think that is a very important point, and I 
Just wondered how far you would carry it, because we are in the 
midst—this Commission—of trying to define the role of the 
auditor. We are also dealing with various other levels, and 
there are two aspects that I would like to speak to, if you would 
First of all, how far down would you go with it? We start out
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perhaps at the top with the role of the auditor. You can 
get down—you used the word function—to what the function 
of the auditor should be, what his objectives should be.
Then you come down to what the standards should be, the 
accounting/auditing procedures should be, the rules, and so on.
I wondered if there is any use in deciding how far down you 
would go before you let the auditor make the judgment. That 
is one aspect of it. The other is, if you believe that 
other than auditors ought to get into the definition, at 
least, at the top...
Discussion Leader (RE): They are, through the Cohen 
Commission.
(PR): The Cohen Commission has a limited life. What 
kind of recommendations, for example, should the Cohen Commission 
make for a continuance of the proper parties coming together 
to help define what the role should be, what the function should
be?
(GS): Could I react to that, because I think we are 
asking the wrong question. In your cost-benefit framework, there 
certain costs and benefits which are appropriately identified 
by the profession, by the Cohen Commission. They are those 
dealing with the economic or financial benefits and costs. The 
other costs and benefits which are—or at least benefits—which
are totally inappropriate for the profession and the Cohen 
Commission to identify, and those are the ones we are talking
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about in illegal payments, and so on. It seems to me society 
can insist on a compliance audit because society, through its 
duly constituted policy agencies, can say that in order to 
do interstate business, or in order to be chartered as a 
corporation, and in order to do whatnot, you must do certain 
things that we think are socially desirable.
(GB): And when the government has decided that that 
is the case, they take care of it. There is compliance 
auditing in taxes, environmental controls...
(GS): Exactly, that is what I’m trying to say. It 
is the responsibility of those agencies that are responsible 
for setting these social objectives to insist on compliance 
audits in these areas and that this is not an appropriate area 
where the profession itself is in a position to identify, or 
appropriately identify, cost-benefit relationships. I think 
society on the broader level has to do that.
Now, as far as the other one about the fact that 
it is a crime not to report illegal acts, misprison or whatever 
its called, is that true of everybody, or aren’t there some 
limitations on that? Does—is it the duty of everyone to 
report?
(CW): I don’t think there is any such general principle
It is a person involved in active concealment.
(GS): Well, therefore I’m saying, prima. facie, there is 
is
no such obligation within the law as it/presently constituted, 
and therefore I think we are dealing with a straw man.
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(EH): It is probably only a matter of time.
(MFC): I think that that is right, but George, to
take up your point, what is the situation with respect to 
illegal payments that are material, according to conventional
tests?
(GS); There is no question about that.
(MFC): Do you mean that there is no question that 
the auditor should look for it, or no question that he should 
uncover it? So what we are really talking about is the 
nonmaterial payments in conventional terms.
(CW): From a financial point of view.
(GS): And that society must establish a compliance 
standard, it seems to me, and not the financial recording 
profession.
(JR): Society for what party?
(GS): The duly constituted authorities that regulate
interstate commerce and regulate the chartering of corporations, 
and so on.
(GB): Let me just say with respect to what George said that
I think it should be considered as a responsibility of the 
Commission to speak to that issue about society. You don’t want 
to confuse society with legislators and basically with regulators. 
It is not the same thing, and their goals are very often 
different. This isn't to say that democracy is probably not 
the best system that we know; it is to say that it has imper­
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fections. So, that as the profession speaks and talks about the 
costs and benefits to other citizens of these kinds of imposi­
tions, I think it is important to point these things out.
(GS) : They may educate but they may not legislate.
(GB): But I am suggesting that the education aspect
is important to try to communicate to shareholders what
legislators want is not necessarily in their best interest or 
in society's best interest. There is a positive benefit to 
legislators to jump on things that look like scandals and to 
say that we need to have corrective legislation to stop this 
pernicious practice. They hold hearings, get into the headlines, 
get re-elected, and the rest of society bears the cost of that 
re-election campaign.
(HJ) : Once in a while they pass laws, too. Last Friday's 
Times reported a bill introduced by Senator Church that would 
seem to—very brief article—would seem to imply that the bill 
would include requirements for compliance audits on these illegal 
and improper payments.
Discussion Leader (RE): By whom?
(HJ): From the way that I read the article, Bob, it was
the independent auditor. Did I read incorrectly?
(WN): Let's turn this thing around about determining the 
proper role of the auditor.As it has been put here so far it is in 
the context that the auditor seems to be sitting here, passively, 
waiting for somebody to tell him what his enlarged role is.
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What if Peat Marwick, for example, came out with a new
handy-dandy system for detecting illegal behavior of
corporate executives, and then they go out and sell
companies on the idea of having this additional audit.
Pretty soon all the stockholders say that we want that kind of. 
an audit, and whether Peat, Marwick or whoever, everybody has 
now got to have one of those audits, because there is some 
kind of a market demand for it. Would that be the proper way 
to determine the enlarged role of the auditor in this kind of 
area, for example?
Discussion Leader (RE): That is an interesting 
question. It really gets back to some of the points we made 
earlier, that George and some of the others made, about 
whether the marketplace, acting without government interference, 
would, in fact, do this, or whether they wouldn’t. I also 
think that it is a highly technical question. But, on the 
other hand, I would say the specific example you have come up 
with is probably moot, because neither we nor anyone else knows 
particularly well how to audit for these things. Really, 
when you look at what the SEC is saying, they are not saying, 
at least as I read it, they are not saying that we auditors 
have the responsibility to find these things. What they are 
saying is that if we stumble across them, what should we do 
about it, and that is a much different question.
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(WN): Yes, but you have had all these directory’ 
audits, and they found all kinds of little payments. So,
I think you can audit it.
(MFC); Those are special costs.
Discussion Leader (RE): There is a high cost involved 
in that.
(RK): I think the profession’s responsibility here is
to identify the costs, and merely try to lay out to whatever 
level of illegal materiality people might want to get, what would 
it cost to get that in the cost of doing all their audits.
There is a tendency on the part of SEC-type agencies to look 
at the ones which they know about and think about what it would 
have cost to have found that out, given that it occured, 
and they know it occured. Those costs are not very high. I 
think the profession has to say first that the benefits are 
here—and I think I got three out of the four that George 
indicated. That was not a bad list. These are the benefits, 
but we are not sure how to measure them and we are not sure 
where the people are who should be doing the analysis as to how 
much these benefits are worth. Our comparative advantage is 
saying, if you want it for whatever reason, here is what it 
costs, and cost is an increasing function of the degree of 
materiality.
Discussion Leader (RE): I think the Cohen Commission 
must address this question because if they don’t at least talk
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about it in their report, they are going to be criticized
for having ignored the issue. But, given that they talk 
it
about/that is a very reasonable thing to say. We don’t 
know what people are willing to pay for it, but through our 
research we find that if we did this across the whole 
economy, looking for payments down to $1,000 would cost 
so much.
(RK): And how many more auditors would you need?
Discussion Leader (RE): Well, given that we have had 
these audits in special cases, we could probably at least 
get an order of magnitude estimate of how much it costs to 
do these things, and you could project that across all clients.
(DRC): I'm not worried about that, but that is a little 
like where we were with fraud detection when we said that well, 
if you want a detailed audit, if you want us to look at every 
transaction, we can do that, but the cost is horrendous, and
so one. But that is not too relevant because no one wanted
to pay for that consistently. Only when there were circum­
stances to indicate that yes, there was a fraud here, and we 
were concerned with its magnitude, then yes, we do a detailed 
audit. So, you have the extreme cost, and I recognize that 
we can measure that. But how good do you think the ability 
would be to introduce variables into that? So, raising the 
materiality limit and looking for the various small payments 
and setting a higher limit, how well can we scale that cost?
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Discussion Leader (RE): Well, you ask that question, 
and we have been talking about comparative advantages all 
day. I would say that even though we couldn’t get a close 
measure on that, we can do a better job than anybody else 
could of measuring that.
(RK): Yes, we could do it, because, my understanding is, 
you don’t spend a lot of time auditing transactions other than 
testing internal control. You really rely on the balance 
sheet type of audit. I’m not talking about the classification 
of certain payments, whether something is an advertising 
expense, versus a bribe.
(CW): Then we do very little of that, very little.
(RK): That is right, but at least you have an idea 
as to how many transactions you have to look at, how many 
vouchers or how many payments you have to look at in order to 
find a fifty thousand dollar illegal payment.
(DRC): Well, that is not the source of my concern, though
(LL): Bob, are you suggesting that the cost would not
be very high?
(RK): No, I’m saying the cost would be extremely high.
I’m saying that you should be able to estimate them, because 
you know how many transactions there are. I don't know how 
many transactions there are at General Electric.
(DRC): You know how many there are, and you pick them.
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But you have another variable, how deeply do you look at the 
ones you pick? And that is going to be, I suspect, a much
more difficult cost to measure.
Discussion Leader (RE): If a company wants to conceal 
these things, we can't find them.
(RK): And the unrecorded ones are a problem.
(LL): We had one situation where we quoted a fee and 
it was 20% of the year's audit fee. This was a world-wide 
sort of a thing that we wouldn't be doing at all. It was 
20$ of a full year’s fee. Now, I don't know whether we were 
right or not; we weren’t hired to do it.
(RK): But you might say that, if you want us to look 
at every payment of $20,000 or more, every expenditure, and 
make sure that none of those $20,000 payments, as recorded 
on the books, went to illegal campaign contributions, bribes, 
or whatever, we could do it, and it would cost you this much, 
which is not to say that there would not be some other payments 
that had been made that were not recorded. You know, you limit 
the scope to what is recorded.
(EH): The problem, I might point out, is in the use of
the words "and make sure" because the difficulty of deciding, 
once one selects the particular transaction, and looks at it 
and looks at the support behind it, the problem doesn't get 
discussed adequately at a session of this kind, is the difficulty 
of deciding whether that particular transaction is one of these.
-223-
(RK): I think it is incumbent upon the profession to
make these points very clear.
(EH): I'm trying to, if you would only let me. And
the risk of misleading ourselves and our clients in this 
, very 
regard is very substantial.
(LL): Alright, let’s say that society decided that this 
was worth it, that they made that decision, I think we are in 
a better position to find it than probably anyone else. But 
that is a big "if," yes.
(EH): But that isn't a very strong position.
(JR): But the thing here is an input to society's decision 
whether or not to require it is the cost that it would take.
(LL): I think the costs that would be incurred are
measurable. I think the benefits that would be derived from
it are another matter. I think that the society has to make 
the decision as to whether they really want it.
DISCUSSION LEADER (RE): The Cohen Commission said to find 
these things would approximately triple the audit fees in the U.S. 
economy. That tells legislators something they might use in 
deciding whether to require it.
(GB): I would like to raise one other different 
question, which I suspect is more important, that the Cohen 
Commission might consider. When I say consider, what I mean is
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put it in a report and bring it to public attention.
(MFC): I am sorry that we had this meeting today.
(GB): One is the difference between ex ante and ex post
problems. As a matter of pointing out, I would like to think 
in an educational way, to investors and the general public, 
that in advance of a situation, ex ante, they are willing 
to take a certain amount of risk. Everyone does; we cross 
the street against the light, and so on. And ex post, you 
look around and say: "Who can I stick for the loss I took?”
To be the specific, ex ante, I bought New York City tax 
anticipation notes at 9 percent. I knew I was taking a risk; 
that is why I got 9 percent. Ex post I want to stick somebody, 
and I do. It turns out that the accountant" is the first to 
get stuck because the corporation, as was pointed out in our 
meeting, is bankrupt and the people have run off, and the 
accountant is a partnership, and they are the ones to sue.
So, it is a question really of what is the cost to society 
of a situation in which you ,are in fact requiring more insurance 
—which is what we are really talking about—that people would 
be willing to pay for.
The second aspect of that—I Just want to mention 
two aspects and I will quit—is the question of the lawyers’ 
fees and the particular legal situation in the U.S., where if 
an accountant is sued and wins, then the only thing that the
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suing attorney loses is his own time and expenses. Costs are 
not assessed, as they are in England, against the unsuccessful 
plaintiff, and that gives you a situation in which the value 
of lawsuits is greater than you would expect in an unbiased 
situation. I think that might be mentioned. I think that 
is a situation that is going to be worse, because the law school 
are spewing forth graduates in enormous numbers whose 
opportunity costs and time is very low. They have nothing to do 
They haven't any jobs, and they are going to look around and 
say: ’’well, what the hell. It would be good experience to
sue an accountant! Why not?” I think that is a very serious 
problem.
(LL): I have been trying to introduce champerty,
which as I understand is where you sue the lawyer for a 
frivolous suit, but Manny just won’t let it get on the agenda.
(GB): When we talked about benefits, in your cost- 
benefit analysis, you left out the benefits to the attorneys.
(RK): Well, to comment on the first point, we move to 
the system where somehow the accountant is there as the insurer 
of the people who got stuck with a bankrupt company. Clearly, 
one of the costs would be the difficulty that young and 
marginal companies will have in finding auditors. Again, an 
ex ante consequence of the results which say that every time 
a company goes bankrupt, we are going to go out and sue the 
auditors, is that auditors will start withdrawing from clients
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as they get nearer to marginal conditions, Just the point 
where they may need the auditing the most.
(LL): Well, we will charge an adequate insurance premium
(RK): To whom, your good customers?
(LL): The whole works, society.
(RK): You are still better off avoiding the marginal 
customers, given whatever level of insurance premium you charge, 
you are going to be better off avoiding the failing company.
(LL): Well, that is Just pulling out theory. We were 
looking into the audit as an insurance model, as Chuck mentioned 
earlier today. Yes, we actually looked into that.
Discussion Leader (RE): That wouldn't work. If he 
wanted to charge his clients a bigger fee—his good clients 
bigger fees—and I was willing only to audit really top quality 
firms, I would offer lower premiums and lower cost, so I would 
get his clients away from him. So, there would be adverse 
selection and he would be left with nothing but the dogs. So, 
then he would change his strategy. It 'is really too complicated
I think.
(RK): It would still lead to marginal firms having
difficulty finding auditors, certainly newly formed firms.
(MFC): Yes, all of the assigned risks.
(CW): All of the retail land companies are going into 
the assigned-risk pool.
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(MS): Or like compensation, the state would do them, 
like compensation insurance.
(GB): One possibility is that this is very similar
to the malpractice insurance problem, of raising the cost of doing 
business, of raising the cost of investing in the company.
There is also the other aspect of the SEC. They are shifting 
the bias in the U.S. away from larger companies, in that the 
bias against companies is towards the larger companies who are 
under the SEC, in terms of all these requirements, as against 
companies who are not. Now, that has some very interesting 
aspects in terms of the distribution of income in the country.
One, I know when I was in tax practice, the only cheating I 
really saw was among small companies. The large ones almost 
never did cheat; they took advantage of the law, but the real 
cheating was the small guys who had a personal ownership stake in 
the company and for whom every dollar of cheating went right smack 
into his own pocket, as against the accountant working for a large 
company who only got a salary.
(MFC): That doesn’t surprise me, that wasn’t cheating, 
that was just an exercise of judgment.
(GB): That was cheating. That is why I got out of the
business, frankly, I couldn't take it.
(CW): The larger companies steal through a different 
vehicle, though. They steal through jacking up EPS and selling stock
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(GB): Yes, you know and deducting all that kind of 
stuff. The other aspect of it, even with the larger companies, 
if you look at the maldistribution of income or if that is 
a problem then you really want a bias against small businesses, 
because large companies tend to be owned by small people 
through pension funds and in small shareholdings, while small 
businesses tend to be owned by people in the relatively high 
end of the income distribution because they are personally owned 
And so all of our laws are biased against the poorer elements 
in society and in favor of the richer elements. Not that this 
should surprise anyone, but I think it is rather interesting.
(LL): There are one or two environmental laws that try 
to help small business, but that is alright.
(MFC): I think that on George's last note, there is an 
approriate opportunity for me to thank all of you for coming 
here today. I have enjoyed it very much; I have learned some 
things. I did indicate some regret at the very end when you 
began to add on the jobs that the Commission must undertake 
and fulfill. We will try, with your help.
(MS): And on behalf of the Ross Institute, thank you 
all for joining us. It has been a real pleasure. We hope to 
have a publication out based on the tapes of this session in 
the reasonably near future.
(MFC): We need that almost immediately, Mike.
(MS): We propose to do a little better than the Journal 
of Accounting Research. Thank you very much.
